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ABSTRACT 
 
Steganography techniques are concerned with hiding the 
existence of data in other cover media. Today, text 
steganography has become particularly popular. This 
paper presents a new idea for using Arabic text in 
steganography. The main idea is to superimpose multiple 
invisible instances of Arabic diacritic marks over each 
other. This is possible because of the way in which 
diacritic marks are displayed on screen and printed to 
paper. Two approaches and several scenarios are 
proposed. The main advantage is in terms of the arbitrary 
capacity. The approach was compared to other similar 
methods in terms of overhead on capacity.  It was shown 
to exceed any of these easily, provided the correct 
scenario is chosen. 
Keywords— Arabic; capacity; diacritic marks; 
steganography; text hiding. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since ancient times, people and nations seek to keep 
some information secure. Steganography is the approach 
of hiding the very existence of secret messages, hence 
securing them [16]. Steganography has gained much 
importance today, in the era of communications and 
computation. Figure 1, from [1], point out a classification 
tree of steganography. 
 
 The first category in the classification divides 
steganography according to the cover message type. We 
are proposing two approaches that would fit the text and 
image classes, according to these categorizations. The 
linguistic categorization exploits the computer-coding 
techniques to hide information [ 1]. Semagrams hide 
information through the use of signs and symbols. 
According to this second classification, we fit the text and 
visual semagrams class. 
 In the following section, we present some background 
information on Arabic script. In the next section, we 
review work related to Arabic script steganography. Next, 
the Approach section is devoted to describe our two 
approaches and compare them to each others. Afterwards, 
we show the results of some testing. Finally, we 
conclude, acknowledge and provide a list of references. 
2. BACKGROUND ON ARABIC SCRIPT 
The Arabic alphabet has Semitic origins derived from the 
Aramaic writing system. Arabic diacritic marks decorate 
consonant letters to specify (short) vowels [ 2]. Those 
marks, shown in Figure 2, normally come over/beneath 
Arabic consonant characters. Arabic readers are trained to 
deduce these [ 3,  4]. Vowels occur pretty frequently in 
languages. Particularly in Arabic, the nucleus of every 
syllable is a vowel [ 5]. Inside the computer, these are 
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Figure 1. The classification tree of steganography [1].
 represented as characters [ 6]. The use of diacritics is an 
optional, not very common, practice in modern standard 
Arabic, except for holy scripts. 
 Dots and connectivity are two inherent characteristics 
of Arabic characters. We describe them here for the 
convenience of Sections  3 and  5. We use the word dots to 
refer to any separate stroke that comes over or beneath 
otherwise identical glyphs to differentiate among them. 
This includes any single, double, and triple points, 
besides the zigzag shapes called Hamzahs, and Maddahs. 
Out of the Arabic basic alphabet of 28 letters, 15 letters 
have from one to three points [ 7, 10], four letters can 
have a Hamzah, and one can be adorned by Maddah [ 8]. 
Ancient Arabs used to omit and deduce dots in the same 
manner in which standard Arabic treats diacritics today. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Arabic diacritic marks. 
  
 Connectivity is a result of the cursive nature of Arabic 
script. However, 8 out of the 28 Arabic letters do not 
connect to subsequent letters. Besides, even connectable 
letters do not connect to subsequent letters when the end 
of the word has been reached. These issues also restrict 
the insertion of the connectivity elongation redundant 
character, Kashida. 
  
3. RELATED WORK 
Little has been proposed on Arabic script steganography. 
Two inherent properties of Arabic writing, however, have 
been proposed: dots and connectivity. Dots are interesting 
for their frequent occurrences in Arabic text. A first 
proposal of their use has tackled the character design 
itself [ 9]. In this method, the position of dots is changed 
to render robust, yet hidden, information. The method 
needs special fonts to be installed and give different 
codes to the same Arabic letter depending on the secret 
bit it hides. A more practical way has been suggested in 
[ 10] and [15]. It distinguishes the secret-bit-hiding dotted 
letters by inserting Kashidah’s before/after them. A small 
drop in capacity occurs due to restriction of script on 
Kashidah insertion from one side, and due to the extra-
Kashidah’s increasing the overall size of text, on the 
other side. A variation to the work of [ 10] and [15] that 
simply inserts a Kashidah after an extendible character to 
represent a binary bit, regardless of the previous 
character’s dots, might achieve better capacity. 
Aabed et al. [ 11] have made use of the redundancy in 
diacritics to hide information. By omitting some 
diacritics, meaningful streams in them can be kept. This 
paper shares the base idea and extends it to the usage of 
multiple instances of diacritic marks, benefiting from the 
display characteristics of such marks. 
4. APPROACH 
The idea emerges from the way how computers 
display/print Arabic diacritic marks. For most Arabic 
fonts, when the code of a diacritic mark is encountered, 
the image of the corresponding stroke is rendered to the 
screen/printer without changing the location of the cursor. 
Such displaying without displacing leads to the 
possibility of typing multiple instances of a diacritic in an 
almost invisible way. A computer program aware of the 
presence and meaning of such diacritics can detect and 
interpret them.  For example, a program can be aware that 
a multiple diacritics exist in a message. It then can easily 
extract them, as Figure 3 suggests. 
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Figure 2. Diacritics of enciphered text: (a) before & (b) after 
in circle: uncovering the last extra diacritic. 
 
 We emphasize on the word almost when qualifying 
the invisibility of extra diacritics. This fact is because the 
multiple typing of a diacritic character might have an 
effect on the displayed/printed output in some fonts. In 
fact, fonts range from making all diacritics completely 
invisible to revealing them all in an apparent unfolded 
manner. In between, there are two interesting cases: the 
one of revealing only the first diacritic mark, and hiding 
extra strokes, and the one of darkening the diacritics with 
extra strokes. 
 We provide two approaches to exploit the ideas 
above: The textual approach and the image approach. 
Each approach has its advantages in terms of the typical 
steganography metrics [ 10]: security, capacity, and 
robustness [ 12]. Tradeoffs between the metrics in the 
approaches are discussed after their presentation. The 
textual approach chooses a font that hides extra (or 
maybe all) diacritic marks completely. It, then, uses any 
encoding scenario to hide secret bits in an arbitrary 
number of repeated but invisible diacritics. Clearly, a 
softcopy of the file is needed to retrieve the hidden 
information (by special software or simply by changing 
the font). 
4.1 The Textual Approach 
The Direct and Blocked Value Scenarios 
There are several scenarios to make use of this approach. 
One extreme scenario of this method achieves an 
arbitrary capacity: The whole message can be hidden in a 
single diacritic mark by hitting (or generating) a number 
of extra-diacritic keystrokes equal to the binary number 
representing the message. For example, to hide the binary 
string (110001)b = 49d, we can follow the step below with 
n = 50. We get the result in Table 1. 
 This number n might be huge! One solution can be to 
perform the previous scenario on a block of limited 
number of bits. For this scenario, consider the same 
example of (110001)b as a secret message, we repeat the 
first diacritic 3 extra times (3 = (11)b); the second one, 0 
extra times (0 = (00)b); and the third one, 1 extra time 
(1=(01)b). Figure 4 manifests the pseudo-code of such 
general case. A second scenario can be analogous to the 
run-length encoding (RLE) compression approach.  
 
Figure 4. Pseudo-code for the value scenarios. 
 
The RLE Scenario 
In the RLE (run-length encoding) scenario, we repeat the 
first diacritic mark in text as much as the number of 
consecutive, say, ones emerging in the beginning of the 
secret message stream.  Similarly, the second diacritic is 
repeated equivalently to the number of the consecutive 
zeros in the secret text. In the same way, all oddly-
ordered diacritics are repeated according to the number of 
next consecutive ones, and all the evenly-ordered ones 
repeat according to the zeros. Figure 5 presents a pseudo-
code describing this method. 
 
Figure 5. Pseudocode for the RLE scenarios. 
 
 
 For seek of completeness, we reproduce the example for the 
RLE case, as well. The algorithm will imply repeating the first 
diacritic 2 times (2 = number of 1’s in (11)b); the second one, 3 
times (3 = number of 0’s in (000)b); and the third one, 1 time 
(for 1). 
4.2  The Image Approach 
The image approach, on the other hand, selects one of the 
fonts that slightly darken multiple occurrences of 
diacritics. Figure 6 (a) shows how black level of the 
diacritics is darkened by multiple instances. Figure 6 (b) 
quantizes the brightness levels of such diacritics by 
adding the 24 colour-bits of each as one concatenated 
number. Notice that the less the brightness level, the more 
the darkness is. 
 This approach needs to convert the document into 
image form to survive printing. This step is necessary 
because the printing technology differs from the 
displaying technology in rendering such Arabic complex 
characters [12]. We found that printing doesn’t darken 
For block bi containing a number nd 
   Repeat the ith diacritic nd times. 
While(secret.hasMore & cover.hasMore 
   b = b^ 
   While(secret.b = b) 
 Type diacritic 
            (a)                                                                                                                  (b) 
 
Figure 6. (a) The image of diacritics, from a single instance in first row up to 5 repetitions in the fifth 2, 3, 4 and 5 
times each (presented from the leftmost to the right most column of each diacritic). 
 (b) Quantization of the brightness levels of such diacritics by adding the 24 color-bits. 
 
 
extra diacritic instances of text, even when the display 
does. This unfortunate fact reduces the possible number 
of repetition of a diacritic to the one that can survive a 
printing-and scanning process (up to 4 as the last two 
columns of the first diacritic in Figure 3 (b) suggest). 
 
 
Table 1. Results of encodings of the binary value 110001 
according to the two scenarios of the first approach  
Scenario Extra diacritics 
1st scenario (stream) 49. 
1st scenario block size=2 3 + 0 + 1 = 4. 
2nd scenario (RLE start=1)  (2-1) + (3-1) + (1-1) = 3. 
 
 
These limitations force us to stick to the first encoding 
scenario with a small block size (up to 2, perhaps). More 
catastrophically, yet, the size of the image containing text 
is, typically by orders, larger than that of the text it 
represents! However, if the media is paper, this capacity 
measure re-considers the number of characters in a 
printed page rather than the number of bits. This method 
can also be considered for printing watermarking. It’s 
worth mentioning that to increase security it’s best to  
transform the text or image into a common format, such 
as PDF, for example. This act not only hides some 
information regarding the original type and size of files, 
but also prevents from accidental or intentional font 
changes, which can have catastrophic impact on text 
messages. 
 Notes on the capacity, robustness and security of each 
approach are summarized in Table 2. The image approach 
has two entries: one assuming a softcopy of the document 
image is distributed and the other one assuming a printed 
version is. The text approach is not, generally, robust to 
printing. However, it is capable of achieving arbitrarily 
high capacities. The file size might deteriorate the 
security level, however, if this approach is abused. The 
image approach is, to some extent, robust to printing. The 
softcopy version is only mentioned for completeness. It 
has a very low capacity. Its security is also vulnerable 
since text isn’t usually sent in images. The hardcopy 
version of the image approach intents to achieve 
robustness with good security. 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison between the two approaches in terms of 
capacity, robustness and security. 
Approach Capacity Robustness security 
Text  +  
softcopy 
High, up to infinity 
in 1st scenario. 
Not robust 
to printing. 
Invisible,  
in code. 
Image + 
softcopy 
Very low, due to 
image overhead. 
Robust to 
printing. 
Slightly 
visible. 
Image + 
hardcopy 
Moderate, 1st 
scenario, block of 2 
Robust to 
printing. 
Slightly 
visible. 
 
5. COMPARISON TO SIMILAR TECHNIQUES 
We compare the capacity of our approach to the dots 
approach [ 9] and to the Kashidah approach [ 10]. First, we 
need to note that in our, as well as the Kashidah 
approach, hiding a bit is equivalent to inserting a 
character (a diacritic mark in our case and a Kashidah in 
the Kashidah method). The dots approach doesn’t suffer 
such increase in size due to hidden message embedding. 
In fact, the dotted approach can be viewed as an ideal 
(hence, unpractical) case for the Kashidah method. 
 Since there are several scenarios to implement all 
approaches, we count the number of usable characters per 
approach, independent from the scenario or the secret 
message to be embedded. For this goal to be realistic, we 
find utterances in the Corpus of Contemporary Arabic 
(CCA), by Al-Sulaiti [ 14, 15]. The corpus is reported to 
have 842,684 words from 415 diverse texts, mainly from 
websites. For the diacritic approach, the overhead is easy 
to estimate. Besides, it needs a diacratized text to 
experiment on. Hence, we use the not-heavily-diacratized 
sentence in Figure 7 to extract results. 
 We use p for the ratio of characters capable of baring 
a secret bit of a given level, and q for the ratio of 
characters capable of baring the opposite level. In the 
case of the dots approach, dotted characters may 
contribute to p while undotted characters may contribute 
to q. For the Kashidah method, we study two cases: the 
case of inserting Kashidahs before, and the case of 
inserting them after, the required character. We count 
extendible characters before/after dotted characters for p 
and those before/after undotted characters for q. For both 
methods, we keep characters with Hamzahs in a separate 
class r so as to be added to p or q, whichever is more 
convenient. The last column assumes equiprobability 
between (p+r) and q. In our case, a diacritic mark can 
bare a secret zero or a secret one, hence p = q and r  = 0. 
 
 
ِﻪﻠِﻟ َﺪْﻤَﺤﻟا ﱠنِإ.ُﻩُﺮِﻔْﻐَﺘْﺴﻧَو ُﻪَﻨْﻴِﻌَﺘْﺴَﻧَو ُﻩُﺪَﻤْﺤَﻧ .  
ﺎَﻨِﺴُﻔْﻧَأ ِرْوُﺮُﺷ ْﻦِﻣ ِﷲﺎِﺑ ُذْﻮُﻌَﻧَو  ِتﺎَﺌﱢﻴَﺳَو
ﺎَﻨِﻟﺎَﻤْﻋَأ.  
ُﻪَﻟ ﱠﻞِﻀُﻣ ﻼَﻓ ُﷲا ِﻩِﺪﻬَﻳ ْﻦَﻣ.   
َىِدﺎَه ﻼَﻓ ْﻞِﻠْﻀُﻳ ْﻦَﻣَو ُﻪَﻟ. 
َﺷ ﻻ ُﻩَﺪﺣَو ﷲا ﻻِإ ﻪﻟِإ ﻻ نأ ُﺪَﻬْﺷأو  ﻪَﻟ َﻚﻳﺮ
ُﻪَﻟﻮُﺳَرو ُﻩُﺪْﺒَﻋ ًاﺪَﻤَﺤُﻣ ﱠنَأ ُﺪَﻬْﺷَأو. 
 
Figure 7. Moderately diacratized text to find utterances of bit-
baring units in our method. 
 
 
Table 3. Ratios of the usable characters for hiding both binary 
levels of the three studied approaches. 
 
Approach p q r (p+r+q)/2 
Dots 0.2764 0.4313 0.0300 0.3689 
Kashidah-Before 0.2757 0.4296 0.0298 0.3676 
Kashidah-After 0.1880 0.2204 0.0028 0.2056 
Diacritics 0.3633 0.3633 0 0.3633 
 
 
 The figures in Table 3 are quite near. As pointed out 
previously, the dots approach is actually the ideal 
unpractical case for the Kashidah method. Hence, we 
discuss our and the Kashidah methods in depth, here. In a 
first glance, our approach might seem to outperform the 
Kashidah method for the restrictions on inserting a 
Kashidah are more than those on inserting a diacritic: 
Almost every character can bare a diacritic on it. 
(Although some rare times two diacritics are there, and 
some other rare times none is put). However, deeper tests 
reveal an inherent overhead to diacritics: they never come 
alone; but above/beneath another character. Hence, a 
somehow stable overhead of 2 bytes per secret-baring 
position is found in our approach.  
The advantage of our work, however, is that each 
usable character can bare multiple secret bits with 1 
character as overhead. Although this same overhead can 
be claimed in the Kashidah method, it can’t really be 
applied for Kashidah becomes too long and noticeable. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents the two text and image approaches to 
hide information in Arabic diacritics for steganographic 
use. It presents a variety of scenarios that may achieve up 
to arbitrary capacities. Sometimes tradeoffs between 
capacity, security and robustness imply that a particular 
scenario should be chosen. The overhead of using 
diacritics was, experimentally, shown very comparable to 
related works. The advantage of the method, however, is 
that such overhead decreases if more than one diacritical 
secret bit is used at once. 
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